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Reply to Carston 
 
Carston distinguishes three aspects in my pragmatics : (i) my radical contextualism (i.e., my 
rejection of minimalism), (ii) my account of primary pragmatic processes in terms of 
activation and association (rather than inference), and (iii) my claims about ‘availability’ as 
one of the contrasting features distinguishing secondary from primary pragmatic processes. 
She has no quarrel with (i), but questions both (ii) and (iii). Following her discussion, I will 
deal with these two aspects in turn. 
Carston’s main objection to my account of primary pragmatic processes in terms of 
activation and association is that it makes them too dumb. A similar concern has been voiced 
by Sperber (p.c.) and Breheny (2002 : 178-80). There, allegedly, lies the superiority of the RT 
approach. For relevance theorists, utterance interpretation, whether at the primary or 
secondary level, is a smart, ‘all-things considered’ inferential process which pays due regard 
to speaker’s intentions and whichever factor may be relevant for getting the speaker right. 
Carston provides the following counterexample to show that primary pragmatic 
processes are not dumb. Sarah says ‘Neil has broken his leg’ in a context in which (i) the 
addressee (John) knows two people called ‘Neil’, one of whom is his young son, Neil1, the 
other a colleague in the department where John works, Neil2, and (ii) John is currently 
worried about his son, so that his Neil1 concept is more highly activated than his Neil2 
concept. Given the blind, mechanical nature of the primary process of reference assignment as 
I construe it, Carston says that Neil1 ought to be the winning candidate, on my account.  But if 
we add to the context the fact that (iii) John knows that Sarah does not know anything about 
John’s family life, while she does know that John has a colleague, Neil2, who teaches her 
syntax, then the actual interpretation of the utterance will be quite different from that which 
(according to Carston) my account predicts: Neil2 will be the winning candidate. As she 
points out, « this is explained quite straightforwardly within the RT approach, whose concept 
of optimal relevance includes as a crucial component of interpretation considerations of the 
speaker’s abilities (which includes her knowledge of the world) and preferences  ».  
To a large extent I have already adressed this sort of concern in previous work. Thus I 
made the following reply to Sperber’s analogous objection : 
 
Sometimes the first interpretation that comes to mind (the most accessible one) turns 
out not to be satisfactory and forces the hearer to backtrack. According to Sperber, the 
possibility of such garden-path effects shows that success, for a candidate semantic 
value, cannot be equated with sheer accessibility. This objection is misguided, I think. 
The most accessible interpretation at some stage s in the interpretation process may 
well turn out to be unsatisfactory at some later stage s', thereby resulting in a garden 
path effect and the need to backtrack. This does not show that interpretational success 
cannot be cashed out in terms of accessibility. At any given stage, the most accessible 
interpretation will be the winning one (at that stage). In garden path utterances we 
have two successive stages to consider. Some interpretation is the most accessible one, 
hence wins, at s, but that interpretation fails to fit some schema, hence loses, at a later 
stage s'. In an accessibility-based framework, this means that this interpretation's 
accessibility at s' is no longer sufficient for it to be the winning candidate (at s'). 
Another candidate (which was less accessible at s, but turns out to be more accessible 
at s') takes over, hence the garden path effect. The distinction between successive 
stages of interpretation, together with the notion of an accessibility shift, is sufficient 
to account for garden path effects within the accessibility-based framework. (Recanati 
1995 : 227 ; 2004 : 32) 
 
This is exactly what happens in the ‘Neil’ example. As Carston herself puts it, Neil1 is 
initially the most accessible candidate, so it is initially the winning candidate (at stage s). This 
means that the first interpretation that comes to  the mind of the speaker (for whom Neil1 is 
very salient) is mistaken and has to be corrected at stage s’ when the hearer realizes that the 
speaker cannot be referring to Neil1. Here stage s’ corresponds to what we might call the 
externalization of the explicature, i.e. the step when the primary meaning is embedded within 
the meta-representational schema ‘The speaker says that…’ At that stage, an accessibility-
shift occurs, for the following reason : Sarah (the speaker) is unconnected to Neil1, while 
she’s got some connection to Neil2. As a result of this, Neil2 becomes the most accessible 
candidate at stage s’. That is so because, owing to the connection between them in the 
knowledge base of the interpreter, the concept of Sarah and the concept of Neil2 mutually 
reinforce their activation, so that the winning interpretation at s’ (the externalization stage) is 
Sarah tells me that Neil2 has broken a leg. This is very similar to the other sorts of 
accessibility-shift I have described in the works Carston refers to. 
To be sure, there is something special about the accessility-shift in this example, as 
opposed to e.g. the stolen wallet example (Recanati 1995 : 225-6, 2004 : 30-31). There are 
actually two differences, which go a long way towards explaining why Carston believes I 
should have trouble here. The first difference is that the accessibility-shift occurs when the 
explicature is externalized, that is, when the interpreter starts paying attention to the fact that 
the speaker is saying what she is saying. There is something meta-representational in this sort 
of case, as opposed to other cases (like the stolen wallet example, where the shift occurs 
before externalization). The second feature has to do with the role of schemata or scripts in 
examples like the stolen wallet example. Schemata or scripts are an instance of general 
world-knowledge as opposed to particular world-knowledge (such as John’s knowledge that 
Sarah does not know Neil1 while she is acquainted with Neil2). 
As far as the second feature is concerned, let me say straightaway that I do not believe 
(and I never claimed) that only general world-knowledge can trigger the sort of accessibility 
shifts I talk about. Particular world-knowledge can play exactly the same role, and the crucial 
notion of associative ‘links’ between representations apply to representations at both levels. 
So, contrary to what Carston seems to assume, I do not have to start looking for relevant 
schemata or scripts before I can apply the notion of accessibility-shift to the Neil example. 
Still, the Neil example involves meta-representing the speaker as saying something, 
and ruling out interpretations that conflict with what we know of the speaker and what she 
might or might not be saying. This sort of example, insofar as it involves meta-
representational capacities on the part of the interpreter, seems to contradict my claim that 
 
The interpretation which eventually emerges and incorporates the output of various 
pragmatic processes result from a blind, mechanical process, involving no reflection 
on the hearer’s part. The dynamics of accessibility does everything and no ‘inference’ 
is required. In particular, there is no need to consider the speaker’s beliefs and 
intentions. (Recanati 2004 : 32 ; my current emphasis) 
 
Indeed, the last sentence (that I have italicized) goes too far. At some point the explicature is 
externalized, and the externalization process itself may contribute to shaping the explicature, 
as in the Neil example. This means that the interpretation process may involve some meta-
representational component even at the primary level. It may, but it need not : that is 
presumably sufficient to ground the difference between the primary and the secondary level. 
(The secondary level is essentially meta-representational : to understand conversational 
implicatures, you have to be sensitive to the fact that the speaker is saying what she is saying.) 
What I have said about the Neil example shows that my ‘dumb’ processes of 
activation and association may well mimick the smart, inferential processes posited by 
Relevance Theory. In view of that fact, it may be that the difference between the two 
frameworks reduces to a difference in the level of description. Indeed, whatever takes place in 
the brain has got to be dumb at an appropriately low level of description, however smart the 
behaviour that is thereby made possible. 
If this is right – if the smartness of an inferential system can be implemented in a 
dumb associative system, as I claim – then what happens to the contrast I insist on between, 
on the one hand, secondary processes that are inferential and smart and take place at the 
‘personal’ level, and primary processes that are sub-personal, associative and blind ? Am I not 
making a category mistake when I contrast these processes, since I clearly provide different 
levels of description for them ? That is how I understand Carston’s main line of criticism. As 
Sperber once put it (in conversation), ‘everything is subpersonal’ at the appropriate level of 
description. If, therefore, we focus on a single level of description (as we should if we are to 
understand mechanisms like mutual adjustment), it is unclear that there will remain any 
substantial contrast between the two types of process. Even secondary processes like the 
inferential derivation of conversational implicatures will turn out to be underpinned by dumb 
processes of the subpersonal variety. 
In response, let me say first, that there would remain a substantial difference between 
the two types of process even if the personal/subpersonal distinction collapsed, namely the 
difference between processes that are global and (essentially) meta-representational, and 
processes that are neither. Second, I do not think the personal/subpersonal distinction 
collapses. Yes, in a certain sense, ‘everything is subpersonal’. Does this entail that there is no 
difference betweens subpersonal and personal processes ? No. Whatever their subpersonal 
underpinning personal processes are consciously available. That is a feature they have which 
‘mere’ subpersonal processes don’t have. In all likelihood, there is something which, at the  
subpersonal level, is responsible for that feature, but whatever that is secondary pragmatic 
processes have that feature (I claim) while primary pragmatic processes don’t. This we can 
express, as in the following table, by saying that although primary and secondary pragmatic 
processes alike take place subpersonally, still secondary pragmatic processes are 
distinguished by their ‘personal’ quality — their conscious availability — to which nothing 
corresponds on the primary side.  
 
 Primary pragmatic processes secondary pragmatic 
processes 
Personal - + 
Subpersonal + + 
 
But Carston objects to my notion that secondary pragmatic processes are consciously 
available, in contrast to primary pragmatic processes. She points out that the availability issue 
is quite complex : « there is a lot more to be said here than simply that secondary processes 
are (dispositionally) available to consciousness while primary ones are not… The current 
observations call for some finer-grained distinction within the realm of availability. » I agree : 
the issue is complex, and a series of rather subtle distinctions have to be made. I have made 
some of them, but more, and finer-grained, distinctions are undoubtedly needed. Among those 
I have made are the following : 
 
- First, there is the distinction between occurrent and (various types of) 
dispositional availability. Note that for me, contrary to what Carston suggests, 
the inferential connection between the explicature and the implicature has to 
be occurrently grasped, even though this may be done intuitively rather than 
by going through an explicit inference. In other words the interpreter must 
only be capable of making the inference (dispositional availability), but the 
fact that an inference is involved must be occurrently grasped.  
- Second, there is the distinction between accidental and constitutive 
availability. Owing to that distinction, it’s not true that a primary pragmatic 
process, on my account, is « predicted to not be available to consciousness » : 
a  primary pragmatic process need not, but it may, be available to 
consciousness. Carston says that the constitutiveness claim is hard to test 
experimentally, and she may be right, but that is an issue I cannot go into 
here. 
- Third, there is a distinction between two kinds of constitutive availability : 
that which derives from what I called the ‘external duality’ displayed by 
secondary pragmatic processes, and that which derives from the ‘internal 
duality’ displayed by some primary pragmatic processes, namely those which 
are responsible for ‘above-threshold’ (transparent) metaphors and 
metonymies (and, possibly, for certain scalar implicatures). That distinction 
has only been briefly sketched in Literal Meaning and much more needs to be 
said about it, and about ‘transparency’ more generally. 
 
On the whole, I think I agree with Carston : to support my availability-based account 
of the primary/secondary distinction in the face of phenomena (such as ‘accidental 
availability’ or ‘transparency’) which blur the distinction, we need to elaborate ways of 
testing intuitions that are much finer-grained than anything currently available. The need for 
finer-grained ways of testing intuitions goes well beyond my availability-based account, 
however — Relevance Theory faces the same problem. The ‘transparency’ which 
characterizes certain primary pragmatic processes is such that in some cases, the 
speaker/hearer is aware that the meaning-ingredient which results from the process is 
extraneous to the semantic core of the utterance (even though that meaning-ingredient 
satisfies the Scope Principle). This awareness can be and has been used to argue that the 
pragmatic processes at issue do not really affect the utterance’s intuitive truth-conditions, 
appearances notwithstanding (see e.g. Stanley 2005b : 230-31, 248-51, and Marti, 
forthcoming). In the same spirit, Stanley has argued that in many cases what Relevance 
Theorists construe as explicatures (because the relevant meaning-ingredients intuitively seem 
to affect the utterance’s truth-conditions) ought to be construed by them as implicatures or at 
least as external to semantic content because the relevant meaning-ingredients do not satisfy 
the Scope Principle (Stanley 2005a : 368). Faced with such challenges, the contextualist 
approach (in whatever clothing) can only be sustained by drawing « finer-grained distinctions 
within the realm of availability ». 
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